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Hans Boutellier, A Criminology of Moral Order, Bristol University Press: Bristol, 
2019; 176 pp.: 978-1529203752, £60 (hbk) 
 
In A Criminology of Moral Order, Hans Boutellier’s aim is to develop a better 
understanding of the moral dynamic of society. Boutellier outlines how moral 
order is constructed within the secularised, modern, Western world. Rather than 
being organised around our faith in something, society is now more loosely 
organised in network relations between people, organisations and institutions, 
resulting in an increasingly fragmented and individualised social order that is 
identity-focused; termed ‘complexity without direction’ (p. 8). Such 
developments in the organisation of society has resulted in change in the 
positionality and function of criminal justice. Criminal law no longer sits at the 
periphery, as a last resort to respond to a breach of society’s agreed sense of 
morality. Instead, criminal law has become the defining authority in design of 
moral spaces, with a specific focus on the role of the victim, who activates 
society’s need for safety and security. In this context, offenders are considered 
to be acting out of choice and so crime is no longer accepted as being the effect 
of circumstances. The consequence is that society has a higher sensitivity to 
crime, which has increased political significance the judiciary and police are no 
longer on the periphery as maintainers or moral order, instead ‘their normative 
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function gives direction to other social institutions’ (p.79). 
Boutellier provides an interesting insight into the developments of the 
concept and regulation of morality in Western society, outlining how society has 
changed in terms of the formation and development of morality, and the role of 
criminal justice within this. The book highlights the need for criminology to 
consider the place of morality in crime and criminal justice, which has previously 
not been a distinct focus for criminological research and theorisation.  
To illustrate his theory, Boutellier analyses two policy issues relating to 
sex and identity; it is here, however, that the analysis loses the clarity that is 
apparent in the abstract explanation of the theory. In chapter 6, ‘Sexual 
offences and mutual consent’, Boutellier attempts to explain how studying the 
development of sexuality ‘reveals a lot about the morality of a culture’ (p. 95). 
While this principle holds some merit, Boutellier’s analysis of sexual violence is 
lacking in criticality. Boutellier argues that in the past sexual violence mainly 
occurred at the margins of social life (a claim that feminist historians would 
refute, see Clark, 1987) and that they occurred as a consequence of male 
dominance at a time when such acts were not deemed to be violating any 
norms. In contrast, Boutellier argues, sexual violence today occurs in the 
context of ‘contemporary equality of women in public, on the labour market, in 
marriage and in sexual interaction’ (p. 100), and so sexual violence is no longer 
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‘an excess in what were basically unequal relations between the sexes’ (p. 
100). Boutellier conceptualises sexual violence as an attempt for men to 
achieve intimacy after they found their ‘advantageous traditional conventions – 
male dominance, the double standards, the right to male nature – simply went 
up in smoke’ with women’s emancipation (p. 100). Boutellier argues that 
modern society resulted in an ‘ambiguous status of sexual norms’ (p. 108), with 
increased sexual violence as a consequence. The analysis presented by 
Boutellier negates the principles of sexual violence as a product of power and 
control by men over women within the context of patriarchy, whereby women 
are still unequal to men (see Brownmiller, 1975). Furthermore, sexual violence 
has consistently been conceptualised as everyday experiences of women that 
range from the “benign” to the “fatal” (Stanko, 1990; Kelly, 1988). My use of 
dated sources to analysis Boutellier’s work is purposeful, as feminist critical 
conceptualisation of men’s violence is now well established and continues to be 
reinforced with contemporary studies (for example, Fanghanel, 2019). 
Boutellier’s analysis of the development of sexual violence as an example of the 
changed nature of morality falls down, as sexual violence continues to be a 
regular feature of women’s everyday lives regardless of the development of 
coherent criminal law to occupy the moral space.  
 Such critique of the applicability of Boutellier’s theory leads to further 
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questions as to the role of criminal law in providing moral order. Boutellier 
concludes that the prioritisation of the victim in contemporary criminal justice 
demonstrates the limits of morality, as society responds with ‘empathy and 
respect’ (p. 74). However, the experience of women who survive sexual 
violence often fails to live up to the idea of empathy and respect (see, Gray and 
Horvath, 2018). While the criminal law and its application are distinct entities, 
this is an area of analysis upon which Boutellier remains silent. A natural 
conclusion of Boutellier’s argument could be that as criminal justice appears 
unwilling to adequality prosecute crimes that are overwhelmingly by men 
against women this behaviour is not considered immoral, except in exceptional 
circumstances, usually involving extreme forms of violence and/or occurring 
between strangers. Boutellier’s analysis of morality provides a distinct 
contribution to the field of criminology and the progression of society. 
Nevertheless, the failure to address such a role of criminal justice reads as an 
omission, as does the failure to reflect how intersecting identities changes 
responses to crime (Crenshaw, 1991).  
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